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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
In essence, if not in fact, the holdings in Vale v. United
States and Chambers v. Maroney indicated there is a difference
between cars and houses so far as the fourth amendment is
concerned. They further indicate there need be no patent
justification for the distinction.
A. Katherine Gallagher
DOMESTIC RELATIONS- ADOPTION: WITHDRAWAL
OF CONSENT AFTER ENTRY OF INTERLOCUTORY
DECREE
In re Adoption of Graves' The Oklahoma Supreme Court
recently held that the consent of a child's natural parents to
an adoption may be revoked and an interlocutory decree of
adoption set aside upon a sufficient showing of fraud, duress
and intimidation, notwithstanding a statute rendering that
consent irrevocable?
The natural parents of Lisa Graves filed their consent to
the adoption of Lisa by her paternal grandparents. On October
4, 1967, the district court entered an interlocutory decree of
adoption in favor of the adoptive parents. On January 19, 1968,
the natural parents filed a petition to revoke their consent
to the adoption and to vacate the interlocutory decree because
of fraud, duress and intimidation on the part of the adoptive
parents. The trial court refused to permit introduction of evi-
dence in support of this petition basing its decision on the
Oklahoma Uniform Adoption Act3 which provides in part:
1 481 P.2d 136 (Okla. 1971).
2 OELA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.10 (1961).
8 Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1953. Oklahoma adopted the Act in
1957 with minor modifications and additions. Montana is
the only other state to express its approval of the Act.
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Withdrawal of any consent filed in connection with
a petition for adoption hereunder shall not be per-
mitted, except that the court,... may, if it finds that
the best interest of the child will be furthered thereby,
issue a written order permitting the withdrawal of
such consent. The entry of the interlocutory or final
decree of adoption renders any consent irrevocable.
(emphasis added) .4
The broad pattern of adoption statutes in the United
States, disregarding considerable differences of detail, is to
make children available for adoption either when their parents
consent or when, as a result of certain specified conduct, the
parents' rights have been forfeited.5 Divergent views have been
expressed by the courts as to the effect of a revocation of
consent before an adoption is finally approved and ordered by
the court. Formerly, the majority rule was that the natural
parents had an absolute right to revoke their consent without
the necessity of showing a valid cause.6 In recent years, how-
ever, the trend has been otherwise, and now the majority rule
is that the right of withdrawal is within the court's discre-
tion and is dependent upon the various circumstances of each
case.7 Revocation of consent has been denied by a few courts
where the proposed adoptive parents have acted upon the
consent by bringing adoption proceedings,8 or have taken the
4 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.10 (1961)
OH. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMsTIc RFLATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES §18.4 (1968); See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §60.6
(1961).
6 See, e.g. In re Anderson, 189 Minn. 85, 248 N.W. 657 (1933);
Colwell v. Blume, 456 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1970);
State ex rel. Towne v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 2d 441, 165
P.2d 862 (1946).
7 See, e.g., In re Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. 230,
181 N.E.2d 836 (1962); In re Mayernik, 292 S.W.2d 562 (Mo.
1956).
8 Williams v. Pope, 281 Ala. 416, 203 So. 2d. 271 (1967); Bailey
v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d 388 (1952), noted in 26 CoNN.
B.J. 314 (1952).
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child into their custody and care.9 A small minority holds that
consent, freely and knowingly given, cannot be withdrawn.10
Oklahoma follows the intermediate theory permitting with-
drawal only if the court feels that "the best interest of the
child will be furthered thereby"."
The rule is well settled that the natural parents have a
right to withdraw their consent prior to a final adoption de-
cree where that consent was obtained through fraud, undue
influence, coercion or other improper means.12 Since legal con-
sent means consent freely and voluntarily given, it does not
exist when obtained through fraud by the adopting parents. "
Graves raised the issue of whether consent could be with-
drawn in Oklahoma after the entry of an interlocutory decree
because of fraud on the part of the adoptive parents. It is a
well established rule in other jurisdictions that the natural
parents of an adopted child are entitled to have a decree of
adoption set aside where the adoptive parents have been guilty
of fraud, duress or other overriding practices. 14 Prior to the
0 In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944),
noted in 20 IND. L.J. 319 (1944-1945); Lee v. Thomas, 297
Ky. 858, 181 S.W. 457 (Ct. App. 1944) (adoptive parents
cared for child with mother's consent for 15 months).
10 Skeen v. Marx, 105 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
In re Simaner's Petition, 15 Ill. 2d 568, 155 N.E.2d 555 (1959).
11 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §60.10 (1961).
12 People v. Weihe, 30 Ill. App. 2d 361, 174 N.E.2d 897 (App.
Ct. 1961); Adoption of McKinzie, 275 S.W.2d 365, 372 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1965) (dictum).
13 Ritchie v. Dillon, 103 Ga. App. 33, 118 S.E.2d 115 (Ct. App.
1961).
14 See, e.g., Meleski v. Havens, 129 Conn. 238, 27 A.2d 159
(1942) (dictum); Barber v. Barber, 280 Ky. 842, 134 S.W.2d
933 (1939); In re Sladky's Adoption, 109 Ohio App. 120,
161 N.E.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1958); Arnold v. Howell, 98 Cal.
App. 2d 202, 219 P.2d 854 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); In re Adop-
tion of Shea, 86 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1956); Attacks on Adoption
Decrees by Natural Parents to Regain Custody, 61 YALu.
L.J. 591, 592 (1952).
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passage of the Uniform Adoption Act in 1957, this issue had
been decided only once by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In
Laffoon v. Hayden 5 the natural parents of minor children
brought an action to set aside an adoption decree because of
fraud and undue influence. The court held:
[A]n allegation that consent to adoption was procured
by active fraud of the adoptive parents through mis-
representations made by them to the natural parents,
and by undue influence wrongfully exerted by adop-
tive parents, and that such consent was not volun-
tary, is sufficient . . . to state a cause of action.16
Therefore, the central issue in Graves was whether the pass-
age of the Uniform Act providing that consent is irrevocable
after entry of an interlocutory decree overruled Laffoon and
barred the natural parents from obtaining revocation of their
consent.
In reaching its decision, the court utilized several well
known rules of statutory construction. The maxim "Statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed"
has often been applied to adoption statutes.17 Although the
process of adoption was unknown at common law and is gov-
erned entirely by statute in the United States,18 an action for
fraud could be enforced as a common law right.19 The Okla-
homa Supreme Court has stated that:
[R]epeals by implication are not to be favored, and
that to strike down a valuable right given by a
16 337 P.2d 736 (Okla. 1959) (syllabus by the court) (fact oc-
curred prior to passage of Uniform Adoption Act.)
16 Id. at 737.
1' See, e.g., Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541
(1965); Hughes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 234 Ore. 426, 383
P.2d 55 (1963).
18 H. CLARK, supra § 18.1, at 603.
10 Nutt v. Carson, 340 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1959); Jewell v. Allen,
188 Okla. 374, 109 P.2d 235 (1940).
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statute and also existing by common law, merely up-
on an inference to be drawn from a new statute, pre-
sents an unhappy manner of adjudicating those rights
and holding that they no longer exist.20
While stating that the welfare of the child is not to be ignored,
the court has also held that: "[A]doption statute is strictly
construed in favor of rights of natural parents when the con-
troversy is between the natural parents and persons seeking
to destroy their parental status."21
Applying these rules of strict construction, the court in
Graves refused to hold that the common law action of fraud
had been abrogated by the "irrevocability of consent" pro-
vision of the Uniform Adoption Act. A decisive factor in the
court's reasoning was the existence of a limitation of action
statute relating to adoption.
In 1953 the Oklahoma legislature enacted the following
law:
An action or proceeding which seeks to vacate, cancel
or otherwise attack or to avoid a decree of adoption,
directly or collaterally, except in the case of extrinsic
fraud shall be brought within one (1) year from the
date of entry of decree; . .. 2
This provision was not repealed by the Uniform Adoption Act,
resulting in two apparently conflicting statutes. One would
prohibit withdrawal of consent after entry of an interlocutory
decree, while the other would permit withdrawal if made
within one year.2
20 Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Cope, 132 Oka. 152, 269 P. 1084,
1086 (1928).
21 Conville v. Bakke, 400 P.2d 179, 186 (Okla. 1965).
22 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §95 (1961).
= 481 P.2d at 138.
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The court in Graves concluded that in view of the con-
tinued existence of the limitation of action statute after the
passage of the Uniform Adoption Act, the natural parents could
revoke their consent and vacate the interlocutory decree up-
on a sufficient showing of fraud, duress and intimidation on
the part of the adoptive parents, notwithstanding the irrevo-
cability provision.
It is the opinion of this writer that an adoption statute,
relating to withdrawal of consent after entry of an interlo-
cutory or final decree, should provide the greatest protection
to all the parties concerned- the natural parents, the adop-
tive parents, and especially the child. Graves accomplishes
this task by providing that:
(1) The natural parents shall not be denied the oppor-
tunity to discharge their duty imposed upon them by natural
law, to rear their children, where their consent to an adoption
has been obtained by fraud.
(2) The adoptive parents shall not be exposed to the risk
of losing custody of their adopted child in the absence of
fraud in obtaining the natural parents' consent.
(3) The child shall not be exposed to the danger of estab-
lishing lasting bonds of affection with the adoptive parents
by the one year limitation of action.
The importance to a child of stability in home life is well
recognized. Dangerous psychological effects may result from
removing a child from the home of his natural or adoptive
parents to which he has become accustomed. The law cannot
place love in the hearts of men, nor can it eradicate fraud
from their minds. Until this occurs, the child must inevitably
suffer.
Boyd Lee Debault
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